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Responses to Marti 
 
 
Michael G. Vater 
Department of Philosophy, Marquette University 
Milwaukee, WI 
 
 
 
Doctor Marti is to be commended for compressing such a rich 
variety of historical reminders and flashes of philosophical insight 
within the scope of his brief and suggestive paper. Among the 
important reminders culled from the tradition are, first of all, the 
pivotal importance of St. Augustine's fusion of philosophical 
inwardness and Christian doctrine, then a correct and careful 
estimation of Kant's location of the ethically active self within the 
noumenal order, and finally a lucid synthesis of Schelling's insights 
into the possibility of a philosophical religion. Marti understands that to 
repeat the tradition philosophically is to renew and restore it. But he 
also brings novel insights to bear upon the Kantian-Hegelian tradition, 
the most striking of which are the assertions that the work of 
ratiocination (Verstand) is guesswork, and that obligation becomes 
objective only in and with the act of taking responsibility. Each of 
these gems deserves to be cut, polished, and set within its own 
extended treatment. 
 
Marti's "Last Objectivism" is an allusive paper, a tissue of 
glimmering insights, not an argumentative exposition. Accordingly, I 
find I must, perhaps contrary to Marti's spirit and method, prosaically 
list what I take to be his claims before I can reply. I am not perfectly 
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confident that I have understood all the nuances of his position, but 
the following seem to be his major contentions: 
 
(1) Both the self and God are "entities" of the same sort, that is, 
non-entities, non-substances, non-actors. Each is a creative agency, a 
relationality, and an outcropping of spontaneity, and each is 
fundamentally for the other. 
 
(2) The self lives "in God." Its freedom, inwardness and self-
identity are apparently limitations of, instances of-or better-qualities 
and events evoked by their divine counterparts. 
 
(3) Ratiocination or analytic intellect can only reify both self and 
deity in its attempt to explain, analyze, and establish conditional 
relationships between conditioned objects. Reason can intuit or 
"sense" in a non-objectivistic manner, and is thus fitted for cognizing 
the unconditional. 
 
(4) A "religion of reason" ought to be confined to the individual 
self's recognition of divine or creative acts and its creative response to 
them (for example, will to truth in thinking, acceptance of moral 
responsibility), accompanied by the recognition of ultimate spontaneity 
or freedom as in some sense their source. 
 
Ad (1): A dialectic of devotion and idolatry is involved in every 
attempt to name the divine, for the human spirit simultaneously feels 
itself elevated above itself and yet tempted to understand and control 
the power that tears it out of the ordinary. Marti rightly stresses the 
moment of negative theology in the pious use of intellect, as did 
Aquinas and Cusanus. But perhaps he is extreme. Schelling's notion of 
the infinite non-objectivity of the absolute makes sense only in the 
context of a philosophy of nature and of spirit wherein the absolute is 
seen to objectify or give form to itself and thus become a subject that 
suffers and enjoys a finite world. Marti's negative theology seems to 
divorce the object of religious devotion and intellectual contemplation 
from any specific or describable relation to worldly being, precisely as 
the price for not blasphemously ascribing conditional predicates to the 
divine. In simply and ultimately contrasting the conditional and the 
unconditional, Marti veers toward the paradox Plato voiced in 
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Parmenides 133a-134e; if we simplistically conceive the divine as 
sheer otherness, then religious phenomena such as trust in 
providence, care, and devotion go out the window - things which Marti, 
I suspect, would find essential to religion. 
 
As for his suggestion that we abolish the grammar of "self," 
"person," and "spirit," allowing only "I," "you," and the devotional 
pronoun "God" in their stead, I find the idea not only awkward but 
misleading. The pure "I," Fichte's spontaneous self-positing, Kant's 
noumenal agent which comes to itself only in recognizing and 
accepting moral responsibility, exists nowhere but in a finite setting, 
and apprehends and acts only within a finite history of objective 
circumstances. The "I" of Fichte's and the young Schelling's 
transcendental idealism is indeed not "of this world," but it certainly is 
in this world. Hegel rightly saw that spirit first comes to itself as a 
return from and out of a world that is both objective and, at least in its 
general features, rational. To divorce "reason" and the objectivity of 
the world in so pronounced a manner as Marti does perhaps invites the 
equation of religion with emotionalism and anti-intellectualism. 
 
Ad (2): Marti reproduces most of the ambiguities of Schelling's 
doctrine of God, which cannot conveniently be labeled either theism or 
pantheism, or said to stress consistently divine immanence over 
transcendence or the reverse. But ratiocinative convenience is not 
what is at stake in philosophy of religion, as Marti correctly sees. 
Schelling's theology was anthropological in its method: In one sense, 
self qua spirit lives "in God," or it is God that acts in the self; in 
another sense, what makes the self its own self blinds its vision of its 
divine ground of possibility and tempts it to its fall into singularity. But 
in the moment of religious recognition, the self wills that it not be God, 
that God be more than its philosophical idea, that God be the "Lord of 
being," that is, the absolutely free one, consequently the liberator. All 
of this follows from the interrelation of the human and the divine which 
Schelling builds into his doctrine of the Creation: "Created from the 
source of things and kindred to it, the human soul has a con-science 
(Mitwissenschaft) of the Creation. This knowledge encloses the 
supreme lucidity of all things, and it is not so much the cognitive 
(wissend) agent as it is science itself." (Nachlassband 5). 
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If we object that these Schellingian assertions all fudge on the 
question of the identity or non-identity of the self and the deity, Marti 
would maintain, I think, that the religious relation is what is central to 
religion, that God is pure relation, secure of self and caring of others, 
and so radically free and malleable as to be free from being anything 
at all. As Charles Hartshorne has argued so clearly, divine 
transcendence is not well described in terms of immutability, identity 
and disrelation, but is better defined as an unsurpassable degree of 
sensitivity to, care for, and harmonious interadjustment of, finite 
beings. But while process theologians thus define the consequent deity 
as the limit case of affectivity, Marti seems more successful in 
preserving the traditional notion of God's infinity with his insistence 
that freedom is the mark of transcendence. His inspiration, Schelling, 
despite his persistent taste for metaphysical monism, had managed to 
preserve the "distance" required of orthodox theism and the centrality 
of the concept of the Creation to Christian thinking when he observed 
of the God-human relation, " ... there is love neither in indifference nor 
where opposites are combined which require the combination in order 
to be; but rather . . . this is the secret of love, that it unites such 
beings as could each exist in itself, and nonetheless neither is nor can 
be without the other." (7 :408). 
 
Ad (3): Throughout the paper, Marti employs the Kantian 
distinction of reason and ratiocination in many varied, and some 
distinctly non-Kantian, senses. In general, they parallel Schelling's 
distinction between "intellectual intuition" and discursive intellect, or 
Hegel's more subtle distinction between reason and reflection. At 
various points Marti contrasts reason and ratiocination as, 
respectively: 
 
thinking with necessity 
Platonic epistémé 
action 
sensing or intuitlng 
will to truth 
grasping what ought to be 
 
versus guessing at possibilities 
versus Platonic doxa and orthé doxa 
versus comprehension 
versus explanation 
versus guesslllg 
versus grasping what is 
 
With all this terminological slippage, it is not clear whether reason's 
function is to think, or to intuit, or to act, nor whether ratiocination's 
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task is really to explain or ignorantly to latch onto the first pseudo-
explanation available. One can infer that for Marti the telling contrast 
is between the "reason" that intuits the unconditional (self, freedom, 
God) and the ratiocinative processes suited to explaining finite things. 
Yet when Marti says things such as, "the real question is not whether I 
dream or am awake, but whether or not I am alive," he seems to 
simply juxtapose reason and ratiocination as the practical and the 
theoretical spheres. He aims, in good Kantian (but nonetheless 
philosophically disputable) fashion, to isolate his claims about the 
uniqueness of the mental, freedom, and God's existence from all 
theoretical inspection. Paradoxically, the objects of reason are made 
incomprehensible, located beyond the reach of thought. In 1802 
Schelling himself denounced such moves as "fear of reason." (4:308). 
 
It is plain that I do not find the whole of Marti's critique of 
objectivism compelling, but I am struck by the wisdom of his remark 
that ratiocination guesses. Indeed it does, but cogently, consistently, 
and methodically—yet somehow always merely hovering on the 
surface, for causal or nomic interrelation is ultimately non-knowing, 
non-comprehension, the flight from one item to another, a merely 
conditional cognition of the conditioned. But such cognition guesses 
and errs in another way as well. The will to explain is often 
accompanied by the will to accept an explanation, and the history of 
philosophy is littered with repetitions of the same basic fallacy, the 
acceptance of a partial or one-sided account as a complete 
explanation. Since Hegel we have become a bit more suspicious and 
Popperian, but "all-sidedness" is an elusive goal—for philosophy as 
well as for science. 
 
Ad (4): As for Marti's contention that "the religious soul is 
satisfied with the acta Dei and with the recognition of God as 'Lord'," I 
shall merely translate some remarks (which Wallace failed to provide 
us and) which Hegel made in introducing the second and third editions 
of the Encyclopaedia. Hegel was as concerned as Marti is about the 
damage that abstractive intellect could do to religious life, yet he was 
equally adamant about rejecting an anti-theoretical "religion of the 
heart" as an alternative. In the second Preface Hegel says: 
 
In recent times religion has ever more contracted the expansive 
domain of its contents and withdrawn into the intensive 
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dimension of piety or feeling, oftentimes indeed into such a form 
as manifests a very impoverished and barren substance. But as 
long as religion has a creed, a doctrine, a dogmatics, it has the 
same concerns as philosophy has, and the latter is as such 
capable of being united with religion in these concerns. . . . 
Genuine religion, the religion of spirit, must have such a creed, 
a content; spirit is essentially conscious, so its content is 
fashioned from the objective; on the level of feeling, spirit is the 
content itself, but not objective (it is simply anguished, to use a 
phrase of Jacob Boehme); feeling is but the basest level of 
consciousness, indeed one located in the form of soul common 
to the animals. Thought first transforms soul, with which the 
animal too is endowed, into spirit, and philosophy is just a 
consciousness of this content, spirit and its truth, precisely in 
the form and manner of this its essence; for it is thought which 
distinguished spirit from the animal and makes spirit capable of 
religion. The contracted religiosity which is narrowed down to 
the one point of "heart" must make broken-heartedness and 
brokenness essential moments of its rebirth; at the same time it 
must remember that religion's concern is with the heart of a 
spiritual being, that mind is ordained to be master of the heart, 
and that this mastery is possible only insofar as spirit itself is 
reborn. This rebirth of spirit out of natural ignorance and natural 
error takes place through instruction and through the sort of 
belief in objective truth, in the substantial contents, which 
follows upon the testimony of spirit. (Nicolin and Poeggeler 
edition, pp. 12-13; translation mine). 
 
In the third Preface, Hegel discusses the general state of 
contemporary religious life and links the decay of religious life with the 
decline of philosophy itself: 
 
This poverty of scientific and, in general, intellectual content is 
what separates this piety from the position it directly makes the 
object of its accusation and condemnation. The enlightenment of 
the understanding emptied religion of all content through its 
formal, abstract, contentless thinking, just the way that piety 
does with its reduction of the Faith to the watchword, "Lord, 
Lord." Therein neither position has any advantage over the 
other and, inasmuch as these antagonists coincide, there is 
nothing substantial at hand wherein they could come into 
contact with one another, find a common ground, secure the 
possibility of investigating this ground, and finally bring it to the 
point of knowledge and truth .... Enlightenment theology 
remained entrenched in this formalism of the negative and of 
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freedom, and filled out the content of this freedom according to 
its whim and fancy, so that, on the whole, it was unconcerned 
about its own contents. But for that very reason, Enlightenment 
can do no violence to the content of the Faith, since the 
Christian community must be and evermore ought to be united 
through the bond of a doctrinal outline, a creed. In contrast, the 
generalities and abstractions of the stagnant, not living, waters 
of rationalistic understanding will not admit the specificity of a 
self-determined and articulated Christian content or body of 
doctrine. Meanwhile, the other position, relying on its cry of 
"Lord, Lord," bluntly and outspokenly rejects the completion of 
the development of faith into spirit, substance, and truth .... 
 
Because the rich, profound content of the most sublime and 
unconditional interests of human nature has decayed and 
religiosity, the pious together with the reflective, has sunk to 
the point of discovering its greatest satisfaction in lack of 
content, philosophy has become an accidental and subjective 
need. These unconditional interests have been conformed by 
both sorts of religiosity to nothing more than superficial 
explanation that it no longer requires philosophy to satisfy these 
interests; indeed, philosophy is held, and rightly so, to be 
destructive of these newly created satisfactions and of such a 
finely cultivated sort of gratification. Philosophy is thus entirely 
left to the voluntary and subjective desires of the individual. 
(op. cit., pp. 26-27; translation mine). 
